Abstract: The use of cultural defence has been much discussed in the American context and has figured as one of the areas of concern in feminist assessments of multiculturalism. This paper examined two categories of cases from the English courts, those where cultural context has been seen as significant in interpreting the actions of female defendants, and those where 'culture' is invoked to explain severe acts of violence against women. It argues that cultural arguments become available to female defendants mainly when they conform to stereotypical images of the subservient non-Western wife.
multiculturalism. This paper examined two categories of cases from the English courts, those where cultural context has been seen as significant in interpreting the actions of female defendants, and those where 'culture' is invoked to explain severe acts of violence against women. It argues that cultural arguments become available to female defendants mainly when they conform to stereotypical images of the subservient non-Western wife.
They have not, on the whole, been successfully employed by male defendants to mitigate crimes against women, though there are troubling exceptions. The larger problem is that mainstream culture itself promotes a gendered understanding of agency and responsibility, as when it perceives men as understandably incensed by the sexual behaviour of their women, or women as less responsible for their actions because of the influence of men. The conclusion is that the uses and abuses of cultural defence highlight issues that have wider provenance, for it is when cultural arguments resonate with mainstream conventions that they have proved most effective.
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While she acknowledges the right of defendants to cite cultural factors as mitigating circumstances at the point of sentencing (itself a large concession), she argues that only culture-neutral evidence should be permitted in establishing the question of guilt. Thus 'a defendant who killed his wife upon discovering that she had strayed from the marital bed could interpose the traditional defense of provocation', but he 'would not get the benefit of arguing that in his particular culture, the shame and devastation is elevated'. 8 The courts need to demonstrate multicultural sensitivity, but should not allow for 'cultural defence'.
The debate on cultural defence feeds into a wider discussion of tensions between multiculturalism and gender equality, polemically signalled in Susan Moller Okin's question: 'Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women?' 9 Issues relating to the use of cultural evidence form only one small part of this wider discussion, but raising as they do some particularly pointed questions about the relationship between recognising cultural difference and securing the rights and protections of women, they deserve fuller attention in the British context. In this paper, I focus on ways in which culture is currently invoked in the criminal courts, exploring what problems, if any, these pose for women. I begin with an overview of the general issues (some more overtly gendered than others) thrown up by the use of cultural defence. I then provide a brief background to multicultural practice and legislation in Britain before moving on to address specific cases. is problematic, 'cultural' considerations are primarily raised in cases that involve defendants from ethnic minority groups. Because the overwhelming majority of ethnic minority citizens live in England, all the cases I discuss come from the English courts.
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Why is cultural defence a problem?
What is 'cultural defence' and why is it perceived as a problem? One definition, by Paul Magnarella, is that a 'cultural defense maintains that persons socialized in a minority or foreign culture, who regularly conduct themselves in accordance with their own culture's norms, should not be held fully accountable for conduct that violates official law, if that conduct conforms to the prescriptions of their own culture '. 11 (Note that on this definition, the Chen case would be a misuse of cultural defence, for wife murder is not condoned in contemporary China.) Jeroen Van Broeck argues that such definitions should be supplemented by a definition of cultural offence: 'an act by a member of a minority culture, which is considered an offence by the legal system of the dominant culture. That same act is nevertheless, within the cultural group of the offender, condoned, accepted as normal behaviour and approved or even endorsed and promoted in the given situation'.
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The point of the addition is that Van Broeck believes there has to be a link between the offence itself and the defendant's cultural background before the courts should consider allowing a cultural defence. Just the general fact of being socialized into a different 10 In recent years, some of the key judgments involving the annulment of forced marriages have come from the Scottish courts (Mahmood v Mahmood (1993) S.L.T 589; Mahmud v Mahmud (1994) S.L.T 599). However, these do not really fall within the remit of a discussion of 'cultural defence'. The central issue in the declaration of nullity of a marriage has been what counts as force and consent, and while this has drawn the courts into the interpretation of cultural markers, there is no suggestion that cultural context might mitigate what would otherwise be regarded as coercion. 11 Magnarella, 1991, 67 the scarification would have been accepted as a normal part of Yoruba custom, and that the Nigerian community in Britain was probably not aware that the practice was contrary to English law, was felt to change the status of the offence -though it undoubtedly helped that the children were said to be willing parties to the ceremony, that the scars were unlikely to leave permanent marks, and that the mother was deemed of excellent character. Mrs Adesanya was nonetheless convicted: in English criminal law, a minority custom cannot be a defence to a prosecution, unless this is explicitly allowed for in legislation. She was, however, given an absolute discharge.
The use of cultural defence raises four major issues. The most general is that it threatens to undermine legal universalism. This is not so much because it allows individual circumstances to be taken into account in sentencing (of itself, this is hardly contentious), but because in its larger application, it threatens to elevate cultural (R v Bailey, 1964 , R v Byefield, 1967 ; or behaviour of their victim 20 . The guidelines provided by the Judicial Studies Board (which has, among other things, the responsibility for training judges in matters of cultural diversity) are at one level crystal clear. They offer 'no support whatever for the proposition that "my culture" can be offered as an excuse for any kind of aberrant behaviour'; and the Equal Treatment Bench Book stresses that 'it would be quite wrong to suggest that culture might have caused an Indian or Pakistani husband to strangle his wife, following his discovery that she was having an affair with another man'. 21 The guidelines continue, however, that 'it would be quite right to remind a jury that given the immense significance of honour and shame in South Asia, a husband might well find such an experience far more humiliating than a man of some other ethnic origin.' The qualification potentially muddies the clarity of the initial message, and could be interpreted in ways that diminish the severity of wife-murder.
As the two cases cited at the beginning of this article indicate, culture has been successfully invoked in the American courts as a defence against charges of rape or the murder of an adulterous wife -though the fact that these two figure so prominently in the literature may suggest that they are the exception rather than the rule. The cultural conventions referred to in such cases are often deeply patriarchal. As Okin puts it, 'the idea that girls and women are first and foremost sexual servants of men -that their virginity before marriage and fidelity within it are their pre-eminent virtues -emerges in then justify the ill-treatment of women. Almost equally damaging, however, is the way it represents individuals from these 'lagging' cultural groups. Individuals from the dominant cultural group might be led astray or make mistakes, but are usually deemed as 29 Coleman, for example, has been said to replicate a colonialist feminism that attaches all the virtues of gender equality to the West and all the vices of patriarchy to the Rest; she seems to take it as given that non-European migrant cultures really are defined by patterns of sexual and parental violence; and it is because she buys into these stereotypical representations of non-European cultures that she is so opposed to the use of cultural defence. Leti Volpp 'Talking "Culture"; Gender, Race, Nation and the Politics of Multiculturalism' (1996) Columbia Law Review 96/6 30 . Leti Volpp 'Blaming Culture for Bad Behavior' (2000) 12 Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 89, 96 In one of the cases she discusses, Texan police and child welfare officials launched a massive search for a pregnant runaway -believed at that point to be only ten years old -and her boyfriend; when the couple were located, the girl was placed in a foster home and her twenty two year old boyfriend in a maximum security facility, charged with aggravated sexual assault of a child. Charges were dropped when it emerged that the girl, Adela Quintana, was in fact fourteen (above the age of consent to sexual intercourse in Texan law), and a family court judge ruled that the couple had a valid common-law marriage. In this case, both parties were of Mexican origin, and the events were widely discussed in the press as an illustration of the collision of cultures. It was assumed in these discussions, and indeed argued in the courts, that marriage between an adolescent girl and older man was a reflection of 'Mexican culture'. In a similar case in Maryland, where Tina Compton, a thirteen year old (white) girl married a twenty-nine year old (white) man, none of the media debate and public outcry made any reference to the marriage as a cultural in some way responsible for their actions. No-one suggests that 'their culture made them do it'; indeed their culture has become such a taken-for-granted background that it has been rendered virtually invisible. Individuals from minority groups, by contrast, are more commonly conceptualised as defined by and definitive of their culture, so that even the most aberrant can become 'typical' products of their cultural norms. In his judgement on the Chen case, Judge Pincus described Chen as 'the product of his culture' 31 : the individual is read off the culture, and the culture off the individual in turn.
Though it arrives at it by a different route, it might be said that this analysis of cultural essentialism leads to much the same conclusion as the Okin/Coleman critique:
that cultural defence is a highly dubious development, and ought to be stopped in its tracks. This is not, however, the conclusion reached by Leti Volpp, who cautions against 'an all-or-nothing approach that either precludes all cultural evidence, or admits it without challenge' 32 . Cultural evidence must, she argues, be interrogated for stereotypes, preferably by enabling competing narratives to be heard. But simply disallowing cultural evidence would encourage the false belief that the law has no culture, thereby leaving 'American identity, and specifically the identity of United States law, a neutral and unquestioned backdrop'. 33 When references to cultural difference are disallowed, this has the effect of confirming the (supposedly non-cultural) majority norm. This is one of the key issues arising in the assessment of cultural evidence and cultural defence. It seems entirely plausible that existing legal practice will be imbued with the cultural norms of dominant groups. If so, then refusing to acknowledge cultural phenomenon. It seems that it is only when the parties concerned are relatively recent migrants from nonEuropean countries that child marriage becomes a reflection of cultural traditions. 31 Cited in Chiu 'The Cultural Defense', 1053 32 Volpp 'Talking Culture ', 1612 diversity -refusing to problematise cultural assumptions -puts members of minority communities at an unfair disadvantage. This is the danger highlighted by the Judicial Studies Board, which warns of the way 'erroneous assumptions can be drawn about the credibility of those from minority backgrounds before they even say anything at all', and the risk of juries 'deploying their own assumptions to evaluate the behaviour of those whose cultural conventions are different from their own'. 34 The implication is that the use of cultural evidence is not at odds with principles of legal universalism; it should be regarded, rather, as a way of ensuring that these very principles are upheld.
This perhaps enables us to resolve the first of the problems outlined above, but the other ones of course remain. Defendants could clearly employ culture in opportunistic ways, for when faced with the prospects of a criminal conviction, one might well exaggerate the centrality of certain cultural practices in order to establish a legal defence.
And in relation specifically to women, an uncritical use of culture could have two particularly damaging effects. First, it could encourage the courts to excuse, or at least mitigate, crimes against women, because it might lead them to accept such crimes as 'normal' within a different cultural context or different cultural codes. Secondly, it could diminish women (and men) from minority cultural groups by mis-representing their cultures, and mis-representing the individuals as less than autonomous beings.
Cultural Practice in England and Wales
The practices associated with multiculturalism in Britain fall broadly into the category of extensions and exemptions. Some seek to extend to other cultural groups 'privileges' Extensions are sometimes contested on the grounds of practicability -that there are just too many groups to take into account. Sometimes, more simply, the objection is that they do challenge the privileged status of the dominant culture. In most ways, however, extensions look the least controversial face of multicultural policy. The object is to redress a previous bias -sometimes deliberate, sometimes just unthinking -and ensure more equitable treatment. Because, however, they give added legitimacy to religious and cultural groupings, they can also work to strengthen the power of religious and cultural leaders over their members. For feminists in particular, they therefore continue to give cause for concern.
The more obviously controversial initiatives seek exemptions for members of particular cultural groups from requirements that are legally binding on other citizens, the usual justification being that conformity requires a much greater sacrifice of cultural values for some groups than for others. Examples include the exemption of turbanwearing Sikhs from the requirement to wear safety helmets on building sites or when riding a motor bike; or of Jewish and Muslim slaughterhouses from legislation governing the slaughter of animals. Those most firmly wedded to universal principles of justice may object that conformity to the law always requires more sacrifice from some people than others. Thus, libertarians may also have very strong objections to the law on crash helmets; or to cite a rather unhelpful analogy from Brian Barry, those strongly attracted to rape will be more severely disadvantaged by the legal prohibition on it than those who never felt the temptation. 35 What Barry terms the 'rule-and-exemption approach' is on the face of it more troubling to notions of citizen equality than the idea of extending to other groups privileges previously enjoyed only by one. It has, however, presented less of an issue for feminism, because the standard areas of exemption have so little to do with male power. Criminal Justice Act prohibits people from carrying knives and other dangerous weapons in public, but specifically exempts knives that are carried for religious reasons. Though there is a gender subtext running through many of these examples -it is Sikh men, for instance, who wear turbans, not Sikh women -it would be hard to describe these exemptions as promoting gender inequality or conceding too much to patriarchal power.
They do, of course, give a public validity to claims about cultural identity that might in 35 Brian Barry Culture and Equality (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001) 34 36 The most comprehensive early review is Sebastian Poulter English Law and Ethnic Minority Customs (Butterworths, 1986) later circumstances be employed to more damaging effect; but the immediate implications for gender relations are relatively innocuous.
In some of the areas that have been of more direct feminist concern, legislation has prohibited rather than exempted. Up until 1985, the position on female genital mutilation remained unclear. There was no legislation formally covering this and no cases establishing judicial precedent, but a number of reports suggested that operations were being carried out in the country. that public policy has been overly assimilationist on issues like female genital mutilation and under-age marriage, and that a more thorough-going 'multiculturalism' is required.
My own view is that claims forwarded on behalf of cultural integrity are particularly questionable when they relate to the treatment of minors, who have, by definition, little authority within their cultural group and suffer a double disempowerment by virtue of both sex and age. Leti Volpp's requirement for competing narratives of culture to be heard cannot be met when the key participant is only a few years old. And while one might reasonably query whether the sixteen year old who is assumed to know her own mind about the choice of marriage partner was so devoid of agency a few days earlier, when she was only fifteen, the risks of subordination to someone else's version of what is appropriate to one's culture must surely increase in inverse proportion to age. Where a minor is concerned, the claim that a practice is condoned, accepted as normal or approved by a cultural group is self-evidently open to abuse.
Where something akin to 'cultural defence' arises in the English courts, it has been largely in respect of offences that would also be regarded as such within the defendant's culture, but where cultural factors might be said to mitigate the seriousness of the offence, for example by increasing the nature of the provocation or diminishing the responsibility of the defendant. As will become apparent in my argument, the gender upon personal religion or culture is far more acceptable in a multi-racial society'. Samuels (1981) 48 McColgan suggests that 'the most interesting issue about general defences is the non-availability of a defence related to fear or despair, save to the extent that this can be brought within the reasonableness requirement of justifiable force.' 'General Defences ', 155 important parallels between cases in which culture is explicitly invoked, and ones where it is not perceived as an issue. I shall return to this point later.
English Cases
Two early cases of cultural defence involved prosecutions for under-age sex: R v Bailey, which involved the prosecution of a twenty-five year old West Indian man for intercourse with two girls aged twelve and fourteen; and R v Byfield, where a thirty-two year old West Indian was prosecuted for sex with a girl aged fourteen. 49 The girls were described as either 'precocious' or 'mature', and while this is itself a worrying move, implying that the children were somehow responsible for the course of events, there was no suggestion of non-consensual sex in either of these cases. Culture was invoked at the appeal stage as a relevant consideration in explaining why the men might be unaware that their actions were either unusual or unlawful. Bailey's nine month prison sentence was reduced to a £50 fine, while Byfield was discharged after serving three and a half months of his eighteen month sentence.
Culture intervened here in relation to penalty rather than guilt; and one gets a strong sense from these early cases (as also from R v Adesanyo) that the judges felt they were dealing with a moment of transition from one set of cultural norms to another. In this context, it was felt important that the convictions should reaffirm the requirements of English law, but not appropriate that the individuals concerned should bear the full weight of the legal penalty. Bailey was said not to have known that his conduct was unlawful, and to be so shocked by his conviction that he was unlikely to repeat the offence. Byfield was warned that whatever the social customs in the West Indies, he must in future comply with English law. The judgements in these cases sent a message to new immigrants as to how they should conduct themselves, but the individuals who served as the occasion for the message were not dealt with too harshly. At this point, in other words, the courts could regard themselves as dealing with a one-off moment of accommodation: individuals in transition would be treated with some leniency, but pretty soon, all citizens would have adjusted to 'how we do things around here'.
In later cases, the relationship between cultural background and knowledge of the law has been less prominent, and there is more of a sense that cultural pluralism may be a permanent rather than temporary phenomenon. Two kinds of cases have emerged that are of particular relevance for my argument: first, those where cultural context has been seen as significant in interpreting the actions of female defendants; second, those where 'culture' is invoked to mitigate severe acts of violence against women. The first category has been problematic because of the differential treatment accorded to women, depending on how closely they conform to images of female subservience; the second, more starkly, because it risks excusing the murder of women. The number of cases is too small to permit firm generalisation, but it does appear that two of the problems identified above -the stereotyping of the non-Western 'Other', and the 'cultural' mitigation of male crimes against women-have arisen in English legal practice.
R v Bibi has been described as '(o)ne of the best illustrations of how ethnic
customs and values may affect length of a prison sentence'. 50 This is a case where a woman benefited from cultural considerations, and had her sentence cut as a result.
Bashir Begum Bibi, a 47 year old widow living with her brother-in-law Abdul Ali, had 49 R v Bailey [1964] Crim LR 671; R v Byfield (check) 50 Poulter 'The significance of ethnic minority customs ',126 been sentenced along with Ali for her role in importing cannabis from Kenya. The cannabis was delivered to the house they shared, and Mrs Bibi had unpacked the contents. She was initially sentenced to three years' imprisonment and her brother-in-law to three and a half. Reviewing this similarity in sentence, the Court of Appeal noted that the social inquiry report on Bibi had described her as totally dependent on her brother-inlaw for support, and socially isolated by her poor English. It suggested, moreover, that she was so thoroughly socialised into subservience that it was hard to consider her as an autonomous actor. '(I)t is apparent that she is well socialised into the Muslim traditions and as such has a role subservient to any male figures around her…Because she has assumed the traditional role of her culture any involvement in these offences is likely to be the result of being told what to do and the learned need to comply…In the light of that history, it would not be safe to credit her with the same independence of mind and action as most women today enjoy.' 51 The Court of Appeal reduced her sentence to six months.
The suggestion that Bashir Begum Bibi could not be credited with 'the same independence of mind and action as most women today enjoy' seems to go considerably beyond her level of complicity in the drugs offence towards a general denial of her status as an autonomous agent. While the decision itself strikes me as appropriate and compassionate, it still gives cause for concern that it drew on stereotyped notions of 'the Muslim traditions' and 'the traditional role of her culture'. It also gives cause for concern that this kind of defence differentiates so sharply between those who conform to prevailing images of female subservience and those who in some way deviate from this norm.
51 R v Bibi [1980] 1 WLR 1193
When Kiranjit Ahluwalia, for example, was tried for the murder of her physically abusive husband, the judge's directions to the jury tended to minimise the cultural considerations. He noted that her marriage had been an arranged one, but this 'may have been the custom'; he observed that her mother-in law had advised Mrs Ahluwalia to separate from her husband if she did not like him, and commented that 'if it was really as bad as all that, it may have been the best thing to do '. 52 There is little acknowledgment here of the difficulties many Asian women have spoken of in exiting from an arranged marriage into a community that holds women responsible for the family honour. In one particularly revealing comment, the judge advised the jury that 'the only characteristic of the defendant about which you know specifically that might be relevant are that she is an Asian woman, married, incidentally to an Asian man, the deceased living in this country.
You may think she is an educated woman, she has a university degree. If you find these characteristics relevant to your considerations, of course you will bear that in mind.' The only meaning I can give to this is that the jury might think she was more trapped in her marriage and less responsible for her actions because she was an Asian woman, but might also see this as cancelled out by the fact that she had a university degree.
Ahluwalia's murder conviction was overturned at subsequent appeal, largely because these directions had ignored medical evidence available at the time -though not used in the original trial -that she was suffering from a major depressive disorder. At this point, the judge laid more stress on her vulnerability, describing her as physically 'slight', as having suffered many years of abuse from the onset of her marriage, and trying to hold her marriage together because of her 'sense of duty as a wife '. 53 In this second judgement, Kiranjit Ahluwalia was represented in terms that more closely echoed the descriptions of Bashir Begum Bibi, appearing now as a passive victim of events. 54 What is striking, nonetheless, is the message implied in that original direction: that were Kiranjit Alhuwalia the 'typical' victim of an abusive arranged marriage, the jury might be more inclined to see her as someone driven to desperate measures; but since she was an educated woman, they probably shouldn't give this much weight. This suggests that 'culture' becomes available to female defendants only when they conform to prevailing images of the subservient non-Western wife. Culture then works to sustain certain stereotypes of the non-Western 'Other'.
The prevalence of such stereotypes has been one of the issues in the campaign to free Zoora Shah, who is still serving a life sentence with a minimum tariff of twenty years for the murder of Mohammed Azam. At her initial trial in 1992, the prosecution had presented her as voluntarily involved in sexual relationships with at least two married men; as seeking to secure from the first of these, Azam, the title deeds of the house she lived in (bought in his name but paid for with her money); conspiring with a second lover to forge Azam's name to a transfer of ownership; paying a hit-man to kill Azam; and when this came to nothing, poisoning him with arsenic so as to stop the civil proceedings he had taken out against her. Zoora Shah gave no evidence in court, but denied the four charges against her.
53 R v Ahluwalia [1992] who had beaten and raped her and encouraged his associates to visit her for sex, and finally putting a powder in his food when he began to show a sexual interest in her twelve year old daughter. A statement based on these interviews was put before the Court of Appeal. If the story was true, however, why hadn't she told it before? Why had she confided in no-one through all those years of physical and sexual abuse?
In their assessment of this last question, the judges accepted 'up to a point' 'the importance of honour in the society from which the defendant springs', and the particular difficulties a woman like Zoora Shah might have faced in making public a history of sexual abuse. But only up to a point, 'because the appellant, as it seems to us, is an unusual woman. Her way of life had been such that there might not have been much left of her honour to salvage, and she was certainly capable of striking out on her own when she thought it advisable to do so, even if it might be thought to bring shame on her or to expose her to risk of retaliation'. Honour, by implication, attaches to the sexually chaste or the dutiful wife, while those exhibiting any capacity for action cannot hope to be believed when they say they were constrained by shame or fear. The fact that one of her daughters described her as a 'strong-willed woman' seems also to have told against her.
You cannot, it seems, be both strong willed and abused by others; you have to be either the helpless victim wronged by others, or someone capable of wrong-doing herself. In the case of Zoora Shah, cultural context is raised but not seriously addressed, and one is left feeling that culture will only be recognised as relevant when women conform to a particular stereotype. A woman portrayed as entirely under the control of male family members may draw on beliefs about non-Western cultures to make a claim for diminished responsibility, but if she is sullied by past sexual encounters or over-qualified by virtue of a degree, she no longer fits the prevailing image. There is little room here for the complexity of most individuals' lives.
When we turn to the second category of cases -those where religious or cultural beliefs are cited as partial defences against charges of murder -the courts have proved largely resistant to arguments that invoke a cultural defence. The number of cases is very small (the four I have identified compare with a figure of around 110 women killed in the UK each year by current or ex-boyfriends, partners or spouses), but the common pattern is the murder by family members of a young woman said to have sinned against religious or cultural prescription by her actual or presumed sexual behaviour. In 1991, Abdul Haq and Mohammed Saleem were sentenced to life imprisonment at the Leeds Crown Court for the murder of their eighteen year old sister, Sharifan Bibi, and Hashmat Ali, her fortyfour year old lover. Sharifan had contracted a marriage in Pakistan, but had returned to England without her husband, and begun a relationship with an older man. Both disappeared in 1988. Though their bodies were never recovered, witnesses in Pakistan testified that Saleem had admitted to the killings -allegedly telling his wife that 'if we can kill our sister, we can kill you also'. Haq was also recorded (secretly) as admitting to his part in the murders during a conversation between the two men in a police cell. Their subsequent appeal against the murder convictions revolved around the use of this tape recording, and supposed difficulties in the translation of witness statements recorded.
Both appeals were dismissed.
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In a later and more fully publicised case, the victim was nineteen year old Rukhsana Naz, who had been married at sixteen to her second cousin, had two children from this marriage, but lived separately from her husband who remained in Pakistan.
When she later became pregnant by a boyfriend she had known since her schooldays, she was strangled by her brother Shazad, with the assistance, it was charged, of her mother and younger brother. 57 The defence of Shakeela and Iftikhar Naz centred on whether they did indeed participate in the killing (in the event, the younger brother was acquitted of involvement in the murder). However, a plea of provocation was submitted on behalf of Shazad Naz, who was said to have been provoked by the revelation of his sister's pregnancy into a sudden and temporary loss of self-control. His 'idealistic' religious beliefs were invoked to explain the intensity of the shame he felt on learning of his sister's condition, and the jury was asked to consider whether Rukhsana's conduct was such as to cause 'a reasonable and sober person' of her brother's 'age, religion and sex' 56 R vHaq; R v Saleem, 1996 57 R v Shazad, Shakeela and Iftikhar Naz, Nottingham High Court, May 1999 (transcript: Cater Walsh and Co.) to act as he did. They decided, unanimously, that it wasn't, and both Shazad and Shakeela Naz were convicted of murder.
Cultural considerations were introduced in this case, but not accepted as justifying the plea of provocation, and the judge commented in sentencing that 'this was a particularly horrific offence, involving as it did the murder of a young pregnant woman, who was already the mother of two children, at the hands of her own family'. Cultural issues also surfaced briefly in the appeal case of the mother, when her counsel referred to the section in the Equal Treatment Bench Book that warns against ethnocentric assumptions, and the danger that a jury might erroneously deploy 'their own assumptions to evaluate the behaviour of those who cultural conventions are different from their own'. 58 But the key issue in Shakeela Naz' appeal was whether the jury had been properly directed on evidence relating to her own involvement. Since her defence had been that she was attempting to restrain not assist her son, she could not also invoke questions of family honour in her defence. Her conviction was upheld on appeal.
In 2002, Faqir Mohammed killed Shaida, his twenty-four year old daughter, with a knife after discovering her (fully clothed) boyfriend in her bedroom. 59 Here, too, the defendant submitted a plea of provocation. Here, too, the 'provocation' revolved around religious beliefs. In considering the plea, jury members were instructed to take into account Mohammed's depression (he had been treated with anti-depressants after the death of his wife) and his 'strongly held religious and cultural beliefs'. The judge accepted, in other words, that Mohammed could legitimately cite his belief that a daughter should not have a boyfriend without his consent, and his strong conviction that 58 R v Shakeela Naz, 2000 59 R v Faqir Mohammed, Manchester Crown Court, 18 Feb 2002 (transcript: Cater Walsh and Co.) sex outside marriage was a grave sin, as possible causes of his loss of self-control. But '(a) man may not rely on his own violent disposition, by way of excuse', and jury members had to weigh the depression and religious beliefs against evidence from six of his children that he was a man with a history of violence towards his children and wife, who had a greater tendency to violence than was 'reasonably normal'. In this case, the jury rapidly came to the conclusion that Mohammed was guilty of murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.
The partial exception to this pattern is the case of Shabir Hussain, who was convicted in 1995 of murdering his sister-in-law, Tasleem Begum, by driving into her while she waited on a pavement for her lover, and reversing the car over her body. At the initial trial, Hussain denied his involvement, so there was no question of him submitting a plea of provocation based on either culture or religion. He was convicted of the murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He successfully appealed against this conviction on the grounds of false identification 60 , and it was at his retrial in 1998 that he introduced a plea of guilty to manslaughter by reason of provocation. The provocation was hardly one that would have stood ground were it not for cultural factors: all that Tasleem Begum had done was to default on a marriage arranged for her in Pakistan when she was sixteen, refuse to sign the documents that would have enabled her husband to get a UK entry visa, and later embark on an affair with a married man. In his judgement, however, the judge acknowledged that her illicit affair 'would be deeply offensive to someone with your background and your religious beliefs', and sentenced Hussain 'on the basis that something blew up in your head that caused you a complete and sudden loss of self-60 (R v Shabir Hussain, 1998) control.' 61 (This resonates with the Chen case, where the judge commented that '(t)he culture was never an excuse, but it is something that made him crack more easily'. 62 )
Hussain's original life sentence was cut to six and a half years.
The contrasting treatment of Shabir Hussain and Zoora Shah -both of whom lied at the original trial and both of whom introduced new defences the second time roundgave rise to extensive media commentary, and certainly gives ground for thinking that cultural defence is loaded against women. The key point in the Hussain case was not so this remains a matter of concern. One might imagine a parallel case in which a member of a white racist organisation claimed he had been put under unbearable pressure by seeing his sister with a black lover, and in a moment of madness, took her life. In this hypothetical case, the defendant might also believe that his sister's behaviour was an insult to the family honour and degraded the family name, but it is hard to imagine any court today accepting this as provocation. One obvious reason for the difference is that there is legislation against racism, but no law (and rightly so) against thinking pre-marital The other way to view these cases, however, is in the context of the much larger category of 'non-cultural' murder cases where men invoke the provocation of an unfaithful or nagging wife to secure the lesser conviction of manslaughter: cases that themselves involve shared cultural assumptions about 'normal' wifely behaviour, but do not present these in explicitly cultural terms. 64 The murder cases discussed above do not, on the whole, suggest a pattern of differential treatment for defendants from minority cultures, and they compare with a much larger category of cases where male violence had been rendered explicable without any reference to cultural tradition. Indeed, the main difference introduced by 'culture' is that these men killed what they viewed as sexually wayward sisters or daughters. The more typical pattern in other cases has been a man who kills his ex-lover or wife. Culture has been invoked, not so much to explain a heightened reaction to what is perceived as transgressive sexual behaviour, but to extend the class of legitimately incensed males beyond the immediate confines of lovers or spouses. The common thread, however, through both 'cultural' and 'non-cultural' cases is the presumption that a woman's sexual behaviour can be enough to provoke a man to lose his self-control.
In these, as in all the cases discussed in this paper, 'culture' operates within a terrain already defined by mainstream gender assumptions: the idea that sex with an under-age girl is more excusable when she is 'mature' or 'precocious'; that women are not really responsible for actions undertaken under the direction of male family members (it was a key principle of English law up to the early twentieth century that married women could not be held responsible for crimes committed in their husband's presence);
or that men explode into rage when they discover their women involved in illicit affairs. Bui killed his three children and tried but failed to kill himself in desperation about his wife's affair (on the face of it, a very similar set of events), his cross-cultural evidence cut no ice with the court. Unlike Kimura, he was convicted of murder, and his death sentence was later upheld on appeal. An otherwise 'good' mother who kills her children in pitiable circumstances can be viewed as an object of compassion; a man who kills his children is likely to be seen as pitiless and cruel.
68
The suggestion here is that cultural evidence only 'works' when it enables judges and juries to fit the defendant's actions into a pattern already familiar through mainstream culture: that in the end, it is the sameness not the difference that matters. Invocations of 'culture' are themselves pretty clearly gendered. They convey for women a particular stereotype of passivity, and for men a meaningful context for violent actions, and are then likely to figure for men in diminishing the severity of their actions, and for women in diminishing who they are. But this gendering of cultural expectations resonates with a wider gendering of criminal responsibility that can leave women defendants with no option but to establish their mental impairment, whilst allowing men the additional recourse to provocation or self-defence. The content of the defences also draws on established norms of gendered behaviour: in Moua's case, the belief that many women 66 People of the State of California v. Kong Pheng Moua (Fresno County Superior Court, February 7, 1985) 67 make a play of resisting men's sexual advances; in Chen's, that violence is a normal male reaction when faced with an unfaithful wife. As Sara Song puts it, the 'cultural defense arguments raised by minorities are given credibility not because they are foreign but because they are familiar to the majority culture' 69 . It is when 'culture' echoes gender norms in the wider society, or gendered practices in the law as a whole, that it is most likely to be recognised as an excuse.
Conclusions
There are two main conclusions to this discussion. The first is that while none of the cases I have identified from the English courts is as disturbing to notions of natural justice as People v Moua or People v Chen, there are clearly some problems with the way cultural evidence is currently employed. In the Hussain case, the prosecution was arguably over-receptive to a defence drawing on codes of family honour, and while not 'excusing' the killing of a sexually active young woman -Hussain was sentenced to six and a half years -the judge accepted in mitigation that her behaviour had put the defendant under unusual pressure. In the treatment of female defendants, meanwhile, 'culture' seems to be allowed or disallowed depending on conformity to cultural stereotypes, leading not only to an inconsistency of treatment between different cases, but to a perpetuation of those stereotypes. Though they appear here in relatively attenuated form, both the problems identified in feminist discussions of cultural defence in America 68 . Chiu 'The Cultural Defense',1113-1120 69 Song, 2002, 32 . In her analysis of the Moua and Chen cases, she notes that most states in the US still admit a 'mistake of fact' defence in rape cases, allowing men to argue that they 'reasonably' mistook their victim's resistance as consent; and that courts consistently accept provocation claims in murder cases, allowing men to present not only adultery but even filing a restraining order or just threatening to leave the relationship as a provocative act of betrayal.
-the mitigation of crimes against women and the misrepresentation of women (and men) from minority cultures as less than autonomous beings -have surfaced in the English courts.
This first conclusion might suggest that the courts should now abandon their attempts to recognise cultural diversity while avoiding cultural excuse, and adopt the more straightforward 'culture-neutral' route advocated by Doriane Lambelet Coleman. This is at odds, however, with my second conclusion, which is that the difficulties that arise in the use of cultural evidence are themselves part of a wider pattern. It is largely when mainstream culture itself promotes a gendered understanding of agency and responsibility -as when it perceives men as understandably incensed by the sexual waywardness of their women, or women as less responsible for their actions because of the influence of men -that references to cultural context have proved effective. If this is so, then it is not the use of cultural evidence per se that is peculiarly gendered. It is not that this has unusually dire consequences for women, and ought on that basis to be curtailed. Such a position would suggest that gender inequities enter only at the moment when a minority cultural context is invoked, that the default position already secures the equal treatment of women, and that this is only threatened when 'culture' is allowed to intrude. Pleasing as it might be to thinks so, this hardly fits with the large body of literature in feminist legal theory 70 ; and is certainly at odds with (government as well as academic) concern about the treatment of rape and male violence against women.
Cultural arguments work when they enable judges and juries to fit what might otherwise be deemed extreme or incomprehensible behaviour into familiar patterns. Chiu puts it thus: 'The jury will process evidence about another seemingly foreign and different culture only to the extent that the jury can relate to it and understand it. Thus, where the jury finds common ground with the defendant, its deliberation and verdict become an exercise in recognizing cultural sameness, not difference.' 71 She takes this as a criticism -that what looks like an accommodation of difference is in truth a reimposition of sameness -but I am inclined to think this is the best one can hope for in the context of a court. The implication, however, is that when the outcome of the process is judgements that favour men over women or defendants over victims, the reasons will lie in the dominant rather than minority culture. It is not the introduction of cultural evidence per se that generates problems in the equitable treatment of women, for such evidence only has the desired effect when it resonates with mainstream conventions.
The argument here links with more general questions about whether gender can be theorised in isolation from culture, and the dangers (much debated in the feminist literature) of setting up these two as separate and distinct. 72 One problem is that women in minority cultures are thereby rendered invisible, or rather are swallowed up in what are said to be their cultural traditions, which are then presented as more unified and uncontested than is ever the case. The problem on the other side is that gender equality comes to be attached to those who are deemed to have no 'culture', becomes attached, in other words, to the dominant culture, where the relationship between the sexes is presumed to be more emancipated and less patriarchal than is the case within minority cultural groups. The further problem that emerges from this paper is that when gender and culture are theorised as distinct, any gender inequities that arise out of cases invoking operates on a terrain already defined by mainstream gender assumptions, and the gender inequities that have been associated with the use of cultural defence need to be understood within this context. The uses and abuses of cultural defence highlight issues that have much wider provenance, and should direct us to a more thoroughgoing challenge to patriarchal norms wherever these appear.
